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I
As an antitrust lawyer, I have a great deal more sympathy for economics
and economic analysis of law than does Professor Blakey in his article on mul-
tiple damages.1  I think Professor Cooter’s article on punitive damages is full of
good ideas.2
Professor Cooter’s distinction between compensation and disgorgement is a
valuable and important one.  Professor Cooter uses that distinction to explain
why different types of damage awards might be appropriate under different cir-
cumstances.  For example, when the goal is to deter forbidden acts—such as, in
the antitrust context, criminal or other per se offenses—disgorgement of the de-
fendant’s gain “provides the correct baseline for computing damages.”3  Com-
pensation for victims’ injuries, by contrast, might be the preferred benchmark
where the goal is to provide incentives for optimal behavior under more am-
biguous circumstances.
Compensation for victims’ injuries is not always optimal, however, because
of a discontinuity problem that can sometimes result in overdeterrence or, to
use Professor Cooter’s terminology, excessive internalization of harm. For this
excessive internalization to occur, four conditions must be met: (1) the injurer’s
conduct (at least with respect to one variable attribute, such as duration) is
valuable or desirable up to a point, but after that point the costs of the conduct
exceed its benefits; (2) liability is imposed only after costs exceed benefits; (3)
the damages cover all the costs incurred by the victim as a result of the conduct;
and (4) the location of the line between desirable and undesirable—between
liability and no liability—is uncertain.  Under these conditions, even a simple,
single-damages remedy could create excessive incentives to avoid harm and
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could thus overdeter socially desirable conduct.4
This insight about overdeterrence can be applied to the antitrust context.
Overdeterrence is undesirable with respect to most antitrust offenses, which
are generally assessed under some form of rule of reason.  Consider, for exam-
ple, an information exchange through a trade association.  Such exchanges are
generally procompetitive, but as we move along a continuum, depending on the
type of information exchanged and the way in which it is exchanged, the ex-
change could become anticompetitive and unlawful.  Or consider a joint ven-
ture that rationalizes production facilities but at some point turns into an anti-
competitive creation of market power, or an otherwise efficient vertical
distribution arrangement that at some point excessively excludes rivals.  If the
line between procompetitive and anticompetitive, lawful and unlawful is uncer-
tain, and the consequence of crossing the line is exposure to liability that is not
limited to the costs incurred after the line is crossed, procompetitive conduct
could be deterred, even by a regime limited to single damages.
It may be that antitrust jurisprudence implicitly recognizes this problem.  In
many cases, particularly those involving price overcharges, damages are meas-
ured only by the unlawful overcharge, not by the entire price charged—or cost
imposed on—the victim.  But in other cases, such as those involving exclusion-
ary practices, the plaintiff is often permitted, as a practical matter, to recover
for his entire loss.  In these cases, courts do not always exclude from the dam-
age recovery the harm the plaintiff would have suffered if the defendant had
gone up to, but not crossed, the line of illegality.
II
At this point, one might be tempted to conclude that even single damages
may be excessive in antitrust—at least in rule of reason cases—and, thus, that
there should not be treble or punitive damages in such cases.  Congress recently
came to that conclusion with respect to certain research and production joint
ventures.5
One obvious response, already recognized in the literature and by Professor
Cooter, is that enforcement errors are likely to lead to suboptimal cost inter-
nalization.6  In this analysis, enforcement errors include both the failure to de-
tect unlawful conduct and false negatives in litigation challenging allegedly ille-
gal conduct.  Under-enforcement because of such errors will obviously diminish
the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws, but it is not clear that false negatives
are a more serious problem than false positives or that enforcement errors in
general are more serious in antitrust matters than with respect to other torts.
Whether under-enforcement is enough to answer the overdeterrence concern
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fully is an empirical question to which I do not know the answer.
There is, however, another aspect of antitrust that distinguishes it from
other torts and that might itself provide a basis to conclude that some form of
multiple damages is needed to prevent underdeterrence.  In the oridnary tort,
the full extent of the loss from the tortious conduct can be described as a trans-
fer from the plaintiff—or victim—to the defendant(s) or, to be more precise, a
transfer from the set of all plaintiffs or victims to the defendant(s).  The auto-
mobile accident victim, for example, bears the loss resulting from the tort,
while the negligent driver reaps the benefits of his excessive speed or inade-
quate maintenance; similarly, the neighbors who have to breathe dirty air bear
the loss from pollution, while the manufacturer benefits from skimping on pol-
lution control measures; and so on.
Antitrust is fundamentally different.  To be sure, in many or maybe even
most antitrust cases, the violation leads to a price increase; the price increase
results in a transfer from buyers to sellers; and the buyers can recover the trans-
fer as damages.  In this respect, antitrust is no different from other torts.  How-
ever, the essence of an antitrust violation is that there is a reduction of output
in the market.  The only unambiguous cost to society from an output reduction
is the loss to the persons who did not buy the product because output was re-
stricted.  This is what economists call the “deadweight loss.”  As a general mat-
ter, the deadweight loss is not a cognizable injury compensable by antitrust
damages.
Therefore, while one can play around with the numbers and concoct all
sorts of hypotheticals, an antitrust regime in which purchasers and excluded
competitors are limited to single damages would tend to undercompensate be-
cause it would not provide compensation for a significant part of the costs re-
sulting from the antitrust violation.  Thus, while single damages might achieve
complete disgorgement (assuming no enforcement errors), the defendant faces
a total damage exposure that is less than the total external or social costs of its
antitrust violations if, as is likely, the uncompensated deadweight loss exceeds
the excessive compensation attributable to the discontinuity problem.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the discontinuity problem, there might be a
case for some kind of extra or multiple compensatory damages in antitrust
cases in order to induce full internalization of antitrust injury, even with respect
to conduct whose unlawfulness was not clear to the defendant.  It, of course,
does not follow that treble damages are the right amount.  That, too, is an em-
pirical question to which I do not know the answer.7
III
One other matter that has not yet been addressed by these authors warrants
attention.  When there are multiple or punitive damages, there will be situa-
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tions in which a plaintiff who suffered a small loss is going to recover multiples
of that loss.  Recall the case of McDonalds and the hot coffee.  The case in-
volved a woman who went into McDonalds, bought a cup of hot coffee, and
placed it between her legs on the seat of her car.8  As she was attempting to add
cream and sugar, the cup overturned, and the coffee severely burned her legs.
She sued, and the jury awarded her $200,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7
million in punitive damages.9
The punitive damage award was very controversial, yet I suspect that the
size of the award was not itself the cause of the controversy.  The evidence re-
portedly showed that McDonalds knew the coffee was dangerously hot but
nevertheless decided to serve it that way.  There may thus be little dispute that
McDonalds should have had to pay a substantial sum in excess of the actual
damages as a deterrent against such conduct by McDonalds and others in the
future.
There is, however, another issue about which there is likely to be less con-
sensus and which therefore jeopardizes any regime in which damages are used
to do more than compensate victims.  That is the windfall that plaintiffs and
plaintiffs’ lawyers sometimes receive from punitive or multiple damages.  I sus-
pect it is the perception that plaintiffs and their attorneys sometimes receive
undeserved, windfall damages, much more than a sense of concern for defen-
dants, that erodes support for multiple or punitive damages.10
There may be a way to reconcile both the need for multiple damages to in-
duce optimal cost internalization or otherwise further deterrence objectives,
and the need to avoid jeopardizing the deterrence process by permitting wind-
fall awards to plaintiffs.  The solution may be to require the defendant to pay
the government, rather than the plaintiff or her lawyer, the multiple damages in
excess of the amount necessary to induce the bringing of the private lawsuit and
compensate the victim.
Of course, if the excess is going to be paid to the government, maybe the
government ought to bring the actions in the first place; that is, maybe the gov-
ernment ought to be permitted to recover civil penalties in antitrust and other
tort proceedings.  That possibility, however, raises a different set of issues that
go beyond the scope of this comment.
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